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Abstract
Entrepreneurship education ranks highly on policy agendas in Europe and the US, but
little research is available to assess its impacts. In this context it is of primary importance
to understand whether entrepreneurship education raises intentions to be entrepreneurial
generally or whether it helps students determine how well suited they are for entrepreneur-
ship. We develop a theoretical model of Bayesian learning in which entrepreneurship
education generates signals which help students to evaluate their own aptitude for en-
trepreneurial tasks. We derive predictions from the model and test them using data from
a compulsory entrepreneurship course at a German university. Using survey responses
from 189 students ex ante and ex post, we find that entrepreneurial propensity declined
somewhat in spite of generally good evaluations of the class. Our tests of Bayesian updat-
ing provide support for the notion that students receive valuable signals and learn about
their own type in the entrepreneurship course.
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1 Introduction
New venture formation is of considerable importance for economic growth and technological
progress (Birch, 1979; Reynolds et al., 1994; Sheshinski et al., 2007). The economic impact of
new businesses founded by university faculty, graduates and alumni is particularly significant.
Academic entrepreneurs are likely to employ more people than their non-academic counter-
parts (Dietrich, 1999), and founders with university education apparently make higher invest-
ments in their business than non-academic entrepreneurs (Reynolds et al., 1994) and their firms
are disproportionately high performing (Shane, 2004). Additionally, university spinoffs create
important spillover effects for the local economy (Harhoff, 1999; Shane, 2004). For Germany,
Audretsch and Fritsch (2002) find that entrepreneurship has become a source of growth. In
awareness of these findings, many governments declare the sensitization and advancement of
potential founders at tertiary educational institutions a primary goal of innovation policies.
Entrepreneurial education is frequently considered an effective strategy (Lin, 2004) to-
wards more innovation. Universities in many countries have followed the example of US insti-
tutions and have instituted a wide range of entrepreneurship education efforts (Fayolle, 2000;
Lin, 2004). Nonetheless, the impact of such education is poorly understood at present. In this
paper we investigate the effects of entrepreneurship education on students’ entrepreneurial in-
tentions. Using a model of Bayesian updating we show that if students differ in their aptitude
for entrepreneurship and if entrepreneurship education helps them uncover these differences,
entrepreneurship training may not always lead to stronger entrepreneurial intentions. In our
empirical study we find confirmation for the prediction that entrepreneurship education has
heterogeneous effects, and that some students graduate from the course with stronger, and
some with weaker entrepreneurial intentions.
Research on the impact and effects of entrepreneurship education has not kept pace with
the growth of teaching capacity. The assertion that entrepreneurship education leads to in-
creased entrepreneurial intentions and therefore to more new venture formation may seem in-
tuitive. However, despite the recognition that education and prior entrepreneurial experiences
influence people’s attitudes towards starting their own business, the impact of entrepreneur-
ship education on intentions to found a business has remained relatively untested (Donckels,
1991; Kruegel Jr and Brazeal, 1994). Moreover, on closer inspection the claim turns out to
be less than trivial. Some studies have suggested that the average entrepreneur may expect
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her life-time earnings to be considerably below those of a salaried employee (Astebro and
Thompson, 2007). Hence, if entrepreneurship training confers a realistic assessment of future
career options, entrepreneurial intentions may very well decline. This need not be a detrimen-
tal effect, if those who have misjudged themselves as fit or well-suited for entrepreneurship
learn to avoid a career that would leave the would-be entrepreneurs and their financiers and
other stake-holders unhappy. But any normative discussion of what entrepreneurship training
is supposed to achieve may be premature as long as we do not have a robust characterization
of the learning processes which students experience in such a setting.
Several previous studies have found a positive impact of entrepreneurship education courses
or programs at universities on perceived attractiveness and perceived feasibility of new venture
initiation (Tkachev and Kolvereid, 1999; Peterman and Kennedy, 2003; Fayolle and Lassas-
Clerc, 2006; Souitaris et al., 2007). Many of these studies tend to have methodological limi-
tations. For example, few studies employ a pre-post design, and even fewer involve a control
group (Block and Stumpf, 1992). Most of the studies have considered self-selected partic-
ipants with some existing predisposition towards entrepreneurship, thus biasing the results
in favor of educational interventions (Gorman et al., 1997). Finally, only very few findings
exist for the German language area (Franke and Lu¨thje, 2000). Regarding the impact of en-
trepreneurship education, there is still a major research gap.
In order to overcome some of the above mentioned limitations, we conducted a study of
a large-scale compulsory entrepreneurship course at a major German university, using a pre-
test–post-test design. The focus of this paper is to explore if students used this course to
learn about their own entrepreneurial aptitude. We provide a descriptive analysis of students’
intentions to become entrepreneurs before the course and after the course. This analysis in-
dicates that the course induces sorting and that especially students who are initially uncertain
about their entrepreneurial ability are able to determine more clearly whether or not they are
positively inclined towards entrepreneurship after the course.
To provide firmer support to these descriptive results we test implications from a sim-
ple model of Bayesian updating using the survey data we have collected. Bayes’ Rule is
frequently used to describe how people update their beliefs under uncertainty in economics.
Recent research by behavioral economists demonstrates that people do not always update their
beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule (Rabin and Schrag, 1999; Charness and Levin, 2005; Char-
ness et al., 2007). However, the experiments undertaken by Charness et al. (2007) demonstrate
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that Bayes’ Rule describes learning behavior better if subjects update their beliefs after inter-
action with people in larger groups, which applies to the course setting we investigate here.
Our paper consists of seven sections. Next, we review the literature on entrepreneurship as
intentionally planned behavior. Then, we develop a formal model of learning which employs
the notion of Bayesian updating in Section 3. Section 4 describes the setting of our study,
Section 5 contains a descriptive analysis of the data. In Section 6, we test the predictions from
our theoretical model. Section 7 concludes and discusses future research.
2 Entrepreneurial Intentions and Entrepreneurship Educa-
tion
The link between entrepreneurship education and entrepreneurial activity may seem somewhat
tenuous. Successful entrepreneurs do not necessarily set up their companies directly after
or even before graduation, although there are notable exceptions. In this section we survey
literature that shows why students’ entrepreneurial intentions matter for entrepreneurship and
how entrepreneurship education impacts entrepreneurial intentions. We also briefly review
other major determinants of entrepreneurial intentions.
2.1 Entrepreneurship as Intentionally Planned Behavior
Intentionality is a state of mind directing a person’s attention (and therefore experience and
action) toward a specific object (goal) or a path in order to achieve something (means) (Bird,
1988). Any planned behavior is best predicted by observing intentions toward that behavior,
not by attitudes, beliefs,personality or demographics (Bagozzi and Yi, 1989). Thus, according
to social psychology literature, intentions are the single best predictor of planned behavior,
especially when the target behavior is rare, hard to observe or when it involves unpredictable
time lags (Ajzen, 1991). When the target behavior affords a person complete control over
behavioral performance, intentions alone should be sufficient to predict behavior, as explained
in the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Intentions have been found to be an unbi-
ased predictor of action, even where time lags exist, for example in career choices (Lent et al.,
1994). Hence, intentions predict behavior, while in turn certain specific attitudes predict in-
tention. Attitudes, again, derive from exogenous influences (Ajzen, 1987). Thus, intentions
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are indirectly affected by exogenous influences: Either they drive attitudes or they moderate
the relationship between intentions and behavior (i.e. facilitate or inhibit the realization of
intentions). And intentions serve as a mediator or catalyst for action: intention-based models
describe how exogenous influences change intentions and, in the end, actual behavior.
This is confirmed by meta-analytic studies (Kim and Hunter, 1993). Across a wide va-
riety of target behaviors and related intentions, attitudes explain over 50% of the variance in
intentions, intentions in turn explain over 30% of the variance in behavior. This compares to
10% usually explained by trait measures or attitudes alone (Ajzen, 1987). Many researchers
see entrepreneurship as a typical example of planned intentional behavior (Bird, 1988; Katz
and Gartner, 1988; Kruegel Jr and Brazeal, 1994). Having an entrepreneurial intention means
that one is committed to starting a new business (Krueger, 1993). The attitude towards en-
trepreneurship may be influenced by educational measures. However, despite the recognition
that education and prior entrepreneurial experiences may influence people’s attitudes towards
starting their own business, the impact of entrepreneurship education, as distinct from general
education, on intentions towards entrepreneurship has remained largely unexplored (Donck-
els, 1991; Kruegel Jr and Brazeal, 1994).
2.2 Research on Entrepreneurship Education Effects
Research about the effects of entrepreneurship education is still its infancy (Gorman et al.,
1997). Most studies up to date aim at simply describing entrepreneurship courses (Vesper and
Gartner, 1997), at discussing the contents of good entrepreneurship education (Fiet, 2001) or
at evaluating the economic impacts of courses by comparing takers and non-takers (Chrisman,
1997). Some researchers have proposed a positive link between entrepreneurship education
and entrepreneurial attitudes, intention or action, but the evidence is still slim (Gibb Dyer,
1994; Robinson et al., 1991; Kruegel Jr and Brazeal, 1994). There has been little rigorous
research on the effects of entrepreneurship education (Gorman et al., 1997). Some empiri-
cal studies do confirm that there is a positive impact of entrepreneurship education courses
or programs at universities on perceived attractiveness and perceived feasibility of new ven-
ture initiation (Tkachev and Kolvereid, 1999; Fayolle and Lassas-Clerc, 2006). Reviews of
literature on enterprise and entrepreneurship education (Dainow, 1986; Gorman et al., 1997)
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and of particular entrepreneurship programs (McMullan et al., 2002) give evidence that these
programs encourage entrepreneurs to start a business. But usually, there are serious method-
ological limitations. For example, studies rarely involve control groups or a form of stochastic
matching (Block and Stumpf, 1992), basic controls as pre- and post-testing are not employed
and most studies survey participants with an existing predisposition towards entrepreneurship,
biasing the results in favor of educational interventions (Gorman et al., 1997).
The studies by Peterman and Kennedy (2003), Souitaris et al. (2007) and Oosterbeek et al.
(2008) are three remarkable exceptions, using pre-test-post-test control group designs. The
first study finds that exposure to enterprise education affects entrepreneurial intentions of high-
school students. Souitaris et al. find that sensitization through a semester-long (January-May)
entrepreneurship program leads to a stronger entrepreneurial intentions. They employed a
pre-test-post-test control group-design and conducted their survey at two major European uni-
versities asking science and engineering students. They received 124 matched questionnaires
from the program group and 126 from the control group. The students of the program group
took an entrepreneurship course as an elective module within their curriculum. Hence, the
allocation of students to the program group was not random, and different classes were taught
by different academic instructors so that the treatment might have differed across classes. Fi-
nally, Oosterbeek et al. (2008) study the impact of entrepreneurship education in a compulsory
course, using an instrumental variables approach in a difference-in-differences framework.
Since students may have self-selected into different school locations, location choice (and
thus treatment) is instrumented. Their results show that the effect on students’ self-assessed
entrepreneurial skills is insignificant. Moreover, the effect on entrepreneurial intentions is sig-
nificantly negative. None of the studies attempts to investigate the nature of learning processes
that are taking place during the respective courses.
Several researchers have called for more research to answer the question if entrepreneur-
ship education can influence entrepreneurial perceptions and intentions (Donckels, 1991; Kan-
tor, 1988; Kruegel Jr and Brazeal, 1994; McMullan et al., 2002). Descriptive and retrospective
studies are not appropriate to provide convincing evidence for the above mentioned theoret-
ical claims (Alberti, 1999; Gorman et al., 1997; Matthews and Moser, 1996). Peterman and
Kennedy (2003) call for the development of credible methods of testing preconceived hy-
potheses, using large sample sizes and control groups, in order to move this young field of
research beyond its exploratory stage (Alberti, 1999).
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2.3 Prior Exposure to Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship education will not have homogeneous effects on all participating students
(Lu¨thje and Franke, 2002), depending for example on their personality structure (Brockhaus Sr
and Horwitz, 1986) or to an even greater extent on their prior exposure to entrepreneurship.
Role models have been found to be a strong determinant of career choices (Katz, 1992). Role
modeling occurs when social behavior is informally observed and then adopted by a learner
who has learned by example rather than by direct experience (Bandura, 1977). According
to social learning theory, role models are important environmental factors for career inten-
tions (Mitchell, 1996). According to Shapero and Sokol (1982), the immediate family, and
in particular father or mother, play the most powerful role in forming a notion of desirability
and credibility of entrepreneurial actions. Empirical evidence for a relationship between the
presence of parental entrepreneurial role models and the preference for a self-employment ca-
reer has been repeatedly reported (Scott and Twomey, 1988; Scherer et al., 1989; Matthews
and Moser, 1996; Peterman and Kennedy, 2003). Boyd and Vozikis (1994) show that en-
trepreneurial intentions are stronger with a growing degree of entrepreneurial self-efficacy
due to the presence of entrepreneurial role models in close relatives.
These insights lead to a hypothesis already stated by Lu¨thje and Franke (2002) who assume
that the effects of entrepreneurship education will differ across students, because students have
received signals of their entrepreneurial ability prior to the entrepreneurship courses taken at
a university. Hence, we need to study how intentions develop given prior assessments. More-
over, we argue that investigating the variable which most studies have focused on - average
entrepreneurial intentions - is not satisfactory if one seeks to analyze the nature of learning
processes. Towards that objective, we also need an assessment of the distribution of inten-
tions, and of changes in the distribution.
3 Model
This section sets out a theoretical model of the effects of an entrepreneurship course on stu-
dents’ beliefs about their entrepreneurial ability. We model the evolution of students’ beliefs
about their own entrepreneurial ability when they receive signals of this ability.
We distinguish between entrepreneurs and employees. Being (truly) an entrepreneur
means that one’s own utility from being in an entrepreneurial function is greater than the
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utility from being in an employee function. Conversely, we label employees all students who
are better suited to non-entrepreneurial work. The label “employee” is not intended to be pe-
jorative. An important function of entrepreneurship education is to help students self-select
into activities which they are most suited to. Our model shows when this type of sorting is
supported by entrepreneurship education.
Initially, both types of student are ill-informed about their true type and form beliefs
about themselves. If we allow for heterogeneity in the strength of previous signals about
entrepreneurship in the student population, then it might be expected that students who have
stronger priors about their entrepreneurial ability are less likely to receive information that
leads them to revise their beliefs about their entrepreneurial ability, and vice versa. Our theo-
retical model identifies conditions under which this intuition holds. We derive empirical tests
from the model to test whether students update their beliefs about their entrepreneurial ability
as a consequence of entrepreneurship education.
3.1 Setting and Assumptions
We assume that there are two types of student: entrepreneurs (n) and employees (m). Students
know that these two types exist and have information about the proportion of entrepreneurs φ,
but they do not know their own type.
We distinguish between signals that entrepreneurs and employees receive about entrepre-
neurial ability. Depending on the culture they live in, entrepreneurs may have stronger or
weaker information about their type than employees. In a culture in which entrepreneurship is
not a predominant feature we might expect formal education to help students discover and de-
velop mainly those talents suited to being employees. In contrast, a culture which accentuates
entrepreneurship is less likely to provide strong signals and training for talented employees
and more signals for talented entrepreneurs.1
In our model students receive information about their ability as entrepreneurs and as em-
ployees in two successive periods: periods one and two. Period one takes place before students
go to university. Here students receive a signal σ1 of their entrepreneurial ability which could
1 Diamond (1997) discusses the reactions of neighboring stone age cultures in New Guinea when exposed to
western civilization. He provides examples of cultures with an entrepreneurial bent which have embraced
modern technologies and more conservative cultures which still observe traditions they have upheld for
millenia. This shows that cultural openness towards entrepreneurship varies considerably. We might expect
formal entrepreneurship education to be particularly effective in cultures that are not entrepreneurial.
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be due to interaction with entrepreneurs, be they parents or acquaintances. Period two takes
place once students go to university. Here students receive a signal σ2 of entrepreneurial
ability from formal entrepreneurship education.
Students’ beliefs about their own entrepreneurial ability are distributed on the interval
[0, 1]. A belief of 0 implies that the student believes absolutely that they are an employee, a
belief of 1 implies that they believe they are certainly an entrepreneur. Each type of student
will receive a positive signal of entrepreneurial ability in each period with probability ψk
where ψ ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈ {n,m}. Define the precision of these positive signals as ςi where
i ∈ {1, 2}.
We assume that entrepreneurial ability either exists or it does not. Further, we assume that
the signaling process is informative. This assumption has two components:
(i) 1 ≥ ψn > ψm ≥ 0 (ii) 1 ≥ ςi > 0. (I)
Part (i) implies that the probability that an entrepreneur-type receives a positive signal that
they are an entrepreneur is greater than the probability that an employee-type receives such a
signal. Part (ii) implies that signals always contain some information.
Next, we assume that students update their beliefs about their own type according to
Bayes’ Rule. We define the strength of positive signals that students receive as:
σki ≡ ψk · ςi (S)
Assumption (I) implies that the belief of an entrepreneur-type student who receives a pos-
itive signal of entrepreneurial ability (σni ) that they are an entrepreneur will not decline as a
result of the signal. Similarly an employee-type receiving a positive signal that they are an
employee (σmi ) will not revise their belief that they are an entrepreneur upwards.
Assumption (I) also implies that there are strictly more entrepreneur-types in the popula-
tion of students than employee-types who receive the incorrect signal.
3.2 Definitions
Initially students only know that a proportion φ of people in the population around them are en-
trepreneurs. Hence their prior of the probability that they are an entrepreneur is φ. Then, in the
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course of their pre university life they receive the first signal about their own entrepreneurial
ability. This signal will generally differ depending on their type.
Beliefs after period one By Bayes’ rule the strength of the beliefs of entrepreneurs that they
are entrepreneurs after period one is:
Bnn ≡
σn1φ
σn1φ+ σ
m
1 (1− φ)
and Bnm ≡
(1− σn1 )φ
(1− σn1 )φ+ (1− σm1 ) (1− φ)
, (1)
where Bnn is the strength of the first period belief of an entrepreneur
n that they are an en-
trepreneur n if they receive a positive signal, while Bnm is the strength of the entrepreneur’s
first period belief that they are an entrepreneur if they receive a negative signal. The expres-
sions in (1) show that the first period signal divides the group of entrepreneurs into two sets,
one of which believes more firmly that they are entrepreneurs (Bnn) and one of whom no longer
believes very strongly that they are entrepreneurs (Bnm).
We define the strength of the beliefs of the employees that they are employees after period
one as:
Bmn ≡
σm1 (1− φ)
σm1 (1− φ) + σn1φ
and Bmm ≡
(1− σm1 ) (1− φ)
(1− σn1 )φ+ (1− σm1 ) (1− φ)
. (2)
These expressions show that employees who receive a misleading signal (Bmn ) that they are
not employees (Type II error) will falsely infer that they are entrepreneurs. Similarly those
who receive the correct signal (Bmm) will have a high level of belief that they are employees.
Beliefs after period two Applying Bayes’ rule once more the strength of beliefs of the
entrepreneurs that they are entrepreneurs after period two is given by:
Bnn|n =
σn2B
n
n
σn2B
n
n + σ
m
2 B
m
n
and Bnn|m =
σn2B
n
m
σn2B
n
m + σ
m
2 B
m
m
(3)
Bnm|n =
(1− σn2 )Bnn
(1− σn2 )Bnn + (1− σm2 )Bmn
and Bnm|m =
(1− σn2 )Bnm
(1− σn2 )Bnm + (1− σm2 )Bmm
where Bnn|n is the strength of the entrepreneur-type student’s belief that she is an entrepreneur
after receiving a second period signal that she is an entrepreneur and a first period signal
that she is an entrepreneur (n|n). Bnm|n is the student’s second period belief that she is an
entrepreneur if she received a second period signal that she is an employee and a first period
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signal that she is an entrepreneur (n|n) given that she is an entrepreneur (n).
After period two there are four groups of students each with a distinct level of belief about
their entrepreneurial ability. These beliefs are a function of the history of signals that students
have received. Two groups of students have received signals going in the same direction and
they now have the strongest (Bnn|n) and the weakest (B
n
m|m) beliefs that they are entrepreneurs.
In contrast the other two groups have received countervailing signals. These groups revise their
belief about being entrepreneurs upwards (Bnn|m) and downwards (B
n
m|n) after period two.
Analogously there are four groups of employees with different levels of beliefs that they
are employees after period two:
Bmn|n =
σm2 B
m
n
σm2 B
m
n + σ
n
2B
n
n
and Bmn|m =
σm2 B
m
m
σm2 B
m
m + σ
n
2B
n
m
(4)
Bmm|n =
(1− σm2 )Bmn
(1− σm2 )Bmn + (1− σn2 )Bnn
and Bmm|m =
(1− σm2 )Bmm
(1− σm2 )Bmm + (1− σn2 )Bnm
.
There are those employees who are truly employee-types and have received a series of con-
sistent signals, leading them to believe quite strongly that they are employees (Bmm|m) or quite
strongly that they are not (Bmn|n). Also, those employees who receive inconsistent signals will
revise their beliefs that they are entrepreneurs upwards (Bmn|m) and downwards (B
m
m|n).
Given these definitions we can characterize the size of the change in students’ beliefs about
their entrepreneurial ability after students update their period one beliefs on the basis of their
period two signals. In the following section we derive a number of propositions about the
changes in students’ beliefs.
3.3 Results
In this section we derive two sets of results: first we focus on students’ beliefs about their
entrepreneurial ability in period two; second we analyze the change in beliefs between periods
one and two. In each case we focus on the strength of students’ beliefs. Stronger beliefs
are beliefs that are further away from students’ initial prior that they are entrepreneurs: φ.
Similarly, stronger signals are signals that are further away from uninformative signals. A
signal is uninformative if it is 1/2.
Analyzing second stage beliefs we show that stronger signals in the first period lead to
stronger beliefs about being an entrepreneur or an employee if both signals are consistent. In
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contrast, beliefs become weaker if signals are not consistent. Additionally, it is shown that
changes in beliefs about being an entrepreneur also depend on the consistency of signals and
on the strength of first period signals. If first period signals are sufficiently strong, changes in
beliefs will be greater for those receiving consistent signals. Both predictions can be tested
empirically, as we do in Section 5 below.
Beliefs after Entrepreneurship Education
We begin with the most obvious implication of updating of beliefs: If there are entrepreneurs
and employees in the population of students, if these all receive informative signals as defined
in Assumption (I), if entrepreneurs’ first period signals that they are entrepreneurs are not too
strong (σn1 < 0.5) and if students update their beliefs according to Bayes’ Rule, then we can
show that:
Proposition 1
The distribution of beliefs after period two will have greater variance than the distribution of
beliefs after period one.
We prove this proposition in Appendix 7.1. There we derive the expectation and the vari-
ance of students’ beliefs that they are entrepreneurs for each period. A comparison of the
variances for periods one and two shows that the variance of beliefs after students’ have re-
ceived the signals provided by entrepreneurship education is always greater than the variance
of beliefs after period one, if σn1 < 0.5.
2
We test whether Proposition 1 holds by testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1
The variance of beliefs in period two is greater than the variance of beliefs in period one.
We test this hypothesis using a robust difference of variances test. This test is robust to
non-normality of error terms.
Now consider the effects of first period signals on the second period beliefs of entrepreneurs
and employees. As is almost obvious, consistency of signals in period one and two will lead
to stronger beliefs. Also, greater strength of signals to either type in the first period will make
second period beliefs more distinct.
2 This result may also hold for greater values of σn1 but we have not pursued the exact bound as we are quite
confident that in the population we study the strength of the signal is weak.
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Proposition 2
If the signals received by students in period one and two are consistent, then beliefs in period
two will be stronger, than if signals are inconsistent.
Stronger first period signals lead to stronger beliefs after period two.
As noted above stronger beliefs are closer to certainty (B = 1 or B = 0) and weaker
beliefs are closer to the prior of uninformed students (B = φ).
In Appendix 7.2 Proposition 2 is proved. In Section 6 we test whether Proposition 2 holds
by testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2
i) If signals are consistent then second period beliefs are stronger.
ii) Stronger first period signals lead to stronger second period beliefs.
To test this hypothesis we regress a measure of strong first period signals (SFPS) and of
consistent signals (CS) on the variance of second period beliefs (B¯) around their mean. The
dependent variable is defined such that stronger beliefs increase the level of the dependent
variable. It does not matter whether the belief that one is an entrepreneur is close to one or
close to zero. In both cases students have strong beliefs and in both cases the level of the
dependent variable is high.
Hypothesis 2 implies that the coefficients on the measure of extreme signals, the measure
of consistent signals and their interaction are all positive. Our empirical model is:
B¯ = β0 + β1CS + β2SFPS + β3CSX + β4
′X + ² , (5)
where B¯ ≡ (B[2]− µ(B[2]))2 captures the squared deviation of students’ second period be-
liefs (B[2]) from the overall mean, CS is a measure of consistent signals, SFPS is a measure
of the strength of the first period signal and CSX is the interaction of the latter two variables.
X represents a vector of control variables. Hypothesis 2 predicts that β1 > 0, β2 > 0 and
β3 > 0.
The Change in Beliefs after Entrepreneurship Education
Now consider changes in the students’ beliefs between the two periods. These changes charac-
terize the impact of the course. We find that it is quite difficult to characterize the relationship
12
between the size of the change in students’ beliefs about their aptitude for entrepreneurial
tasks and the strength of first period signals they receive.
However, if we may assume that the signaling process is informative and also reliable then
we may derive an additional prediction. We have already assumed that signals are informa-
tive above (Assumption I). If signals are also reliable that means students have a probability
greater than 1/2 of receiving the correct signal for their type. In such a setting there will be
more students with correct and consistent signals than students with misleading and consistent
signals. Then it is possible to prove the following additional result:
Proposition 3
If students receive sufficiently precise and reliable first period signals then those who receive
consistent signals will change their beliefs less as first period signals become stronger.
Here a change of beliefs is the difference between the second and the first period beliefs.
Signals are precise if they are far away from the uninformative levels around 1/2, i.e. if
σn1 → 1 and σm1 → 0. Note that we do not have a clear prediction for those individuals
receiving inconsistent signals.
In Appendix 7.3 Proposition 3 is proved.
Proposition 3 can by tested by the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3
If students receive consistent signals, then those among them who have received stronger
signals in period one will change their beliefs less.
To test this hypothesis we will regress the square of the change in beliefs on a measure of
the strength of signals in period one and of consistent signals. We predict a negative coefficient
on the interaction of strong and consistent signals. The dependent variable is squared, since
our model makes predictions about the extent of a change in beliefs, not about their direction.
The empirical model in this case is:
4¯ = γ0 + γ1CS + γ2SFPS + γ3CSX + γ4′X + ² , (6)
where 4¯ ≡ (4− µ(4))2 captures the squared change in students’ beliefs. The remaining
variables are defined as above. Hypothesis 3 predicts that γ3 < 0.
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Proposition 3 is weaker than Proposition 2. It relies on the additional assumption that
the signaling process is reliable. Additionally, it is weaker because our model predicts that
in the counterfactual case in which students receive inconsistent signals there are two groups
with different reactions to more precise first period signals. Our model predicts that these two
groups will be of equal size, in which case these reactions cancel out in aggregate. In smaller
populations we may see deviations from this prediction.
4 Institutional Background and Data Collection
This section discusses the “Business Planning” course we survey and the way in which we
collected our data.
Institutional Background The setting for data collection is the Department of Business
Administration, in the Munich School of Management, at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t
(LMU) Munich, one of Germany’s largest universities. At the time of the course we study,
over 3.000 business administration students were enrolled at this department. The Bachelor
curriculum at the department is somewhat untypical due to its obligatory entrepreneurship
education course ”Business Planning”. This course is comprised of several lectures and inte-
grated exercises. Every business administration student in the Bachelor of Science curriculum
at LMU has to enroll in this course in the third semester of their study program.
The objectives of the “Business Planning” course are threefold: i) to teach students basic
capabilities needed in the planning and management of a startup enterprise, in particular to
convey the necessary knowledge and skills for crafting a complete business plan; ii) to sensi-
tize students for entrepreneurship according to the classification by Lin˜an (2004): students are
supposed to acquire knowledge about small enterprises, self-employment and entrepreneur-
ship so that they can make a rational career decisions; iii) to allow students to gain practical
experience by interaction with real-world entrepreneurs; and iv) the training of key qualifi-
cations such as teamwork and presentation skills. It is important to realize that the course
objectives do not encompass any notion of convincing students to become entrepreneurs or to
describe entrepreneurship as a particularly desirable option. While the economic importance
of entrepreneurship is clearly signaled, students are not meant to be indoctrinated.
The course took place from October 2008 to February 2009 and was obligatory for the
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third semester business administration students. The students were working in groups of five
to develop a full business plan based on an idea developed by an entrepreneur from the Munich
region. More than 40 entrepreneurs were thus supported by 80 student teams, where each
entrepreneur was consulted by two student teams. The two teams supporting an entrepreneur
initially shared basic information that they have obtained on the business concept, but are
then competing against each other. At the end of the course, the students have to deliver the
business plan to the teaching staff as well as to their entrepreneur together with a presentation
in front of hypothetical investors.
The students had to take part in eight lectures conveying the principles of business plan-
ning. These lectures were held by LMU faculty, supported by experts on financial planning
and entrepreneurial marketing as well as experienced entrepreneurs and investors giving a
first-hand insight into their businesses. The students also attended tutorials with 25 students
each, i.e., five teams per exercise group. In these exercises the students repeated the contents of
the lectures and presented their progress in their business-planning project, receiving feedback
from their fellow students as well as from the respective teaching assistant and a tutor.
As far as we know, the seminar concept and the obligatory character of the course, are
unique in German university entrepreneurship education. The setting presents a particularly
suitable framework for our study since students do not self-select into the “Business Planning”
course. Moreover, given that students interact with real-world entrepreneurs we believe that
they receive informative and important signals of their own ability as entrepreneurs.
Data Collection Students were surveyed (either using a written or an online survey) directly
after the kickoff session of the course and immediately before the time when the students re-
ceived their grades at the end of the semester. The survey instruments used had been reviewed
by three academics and 12 non-participating students to ensure clarity of wording and face
validity of the constructs. Out of ethical concerns, we did not attempt to enforce full partic-
ipation in the two surveys. The two survey instruments were largely identical. However, the
second survey also contained items used in the course evaluation.3 The survey forms were
anonymized in both rounds, and matching was achieved by employing a voluntary structured
identification code.4
3 The survey forms are available upon request.
4 The code consisted of the first letter of the first name of the student’s mother, the last letter of the student’s
name, the first digit of the student’s month of birth, and the first letter of the student’s place of birth.
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5 Descriptive Analysis of the Data
In this section we provide descriptive information on the composition of our sample, the way
in which students in the sample evaluated the “Business Planning” course and on the effects
which the course had on students’ intentions to become entrepreneurs. We show that sam-
ple selection biases are not of concern and that the course was perceived as informative by
students. We document that 17.9% of students taking the course who responded to both the
pre and post surveys change their minds about wanting to become founders of an enterprise.
5/7 of these moved from a positive to a negative response, while only 2/7 change their minds
in the opposite direction. Finally, we provide descriptive evidence consistent with Bayesian
updating of beliefs about entrepreneurial ability.
5.1 Participation in the Surveys and Possible Selection Biases
We collected responses from 357 students who either participated the the ex ante or the ex
post survey. They represent 97.8 percent of the total enrollment in the “Business Planning”
course. 265 students participated in the first, 274 students responded to the second survey. For
196 students we were able to match the two survey responses. While our research design has
the advantage that students cannot self-select into the course itself, we may still face selection
issues due to differential propensities to respond to our surveys.
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics
subgroup age female protestant non-German parents self-employed
(years) (%) (%) (%) (%)
pre-survey only (N=69) 22.3∗ 52.8 30.1 29.2∗ 47.8
both surveys (N=196) 21.7 55.1 22.2 18.4 40.3
post-survey only (N=78) 22.9∗ 48.8 24.4 22.5 50.0
Note: ∗-p < 0.10, ∗∗-p < 0.05
Differences significant between students who participated in both surveys and pre- or post-group only.
Post-survey age was corrected by 0.30 years to correct for calendar time of survey.
A first suggestion that we are not facing major (or possibly not any) selection issues can
be taken from Table 1 where we display several demographic variables for three groups of
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respondents: those who only responded in the first survey, those who participated in both data
collections, and those who only responded in the ex post survey. Participants in both surveys
were significantly younger than those who responded to only one survey round. This may
reflect students’ behavior - older students are likely to feel more pressure to focus on their
studies and may therefore be less willing to ”waste” time on survey responses. Moreover,
students not participating in both surveys were more likely to have self-employed parents (in
the pre- and post-survey group) or self-employed friends (in the post-survey group).
However, given that we have some information about non-respondents for both of the two
surveys, we can use a multivariate test whether the likelihood of responding in the ex ante
(ex post) survey is systematically related to characteristics revealed in the second (first) data
collection. We therefore ran two probit regressions in which we predict response behavior as
a function of sex, age, religion, nationality and the employment status of parents and friends.
Moreover, we included scale variables for the students’ attitude towards entrepreneurship,
the perceived social norms in favor of entrepreneurship, the perceived entrepreneurial self-
efficacy, and the perceived feasibility of a startup project. Both probit regressions contained
11 regressors and were either largely or totally uninformative (p=0.089, n=251 in the case of
participation in the post-survey as a function of ex ante data, and p=0.267, n=263 in the case
of ex ante participation as a function of data collected in the second round). The marginal
explanatory power in the ex post survey participation is due to non-German participants and
students with self-employed parents. The non-participation of these students is likely to in-
troduce a conservative (if any) bias in our results.5 The subsequent discussion focuses on the
matched sample with ex ante and ex post information from 196 students.
5.2 Overall Course Assessment and Impact on Attitudes and Skills
We now turn to a first exploration of the impact of the course. Table 2 summarizes evidence
about the ex ante and ex post assessments of several classical attitudinal measures. First,
we use a scale comprised of five items to measure students’ attitude towards entrepreneur-
ship. We tested the scale based on the inter-item correlation. Scale reliability is high for
both surveys (Cronbach’s alpha=0.886 and 0.924 in the first and the second survey, respec-
tively). To maintain the scale information, we do not standardize the two measures. We also
5 The detailed results of these probit regressions are available upon request.
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obtain a scale measure of entrepreneurial self-efficacy based on 20 items (Cronbach’s alpha
0.935 and 0.942), an assessment of the perceived feasibility of handling a startup project (six
items, Cronbach’s alpha 0.750 and 0.747) and finally a measure of perceived social norms.
The latter is based on four items asking for an assessment whether parents, siblings or friends
thought that the respondents ought to become entrepreneurs. These were transformed to yield
a symmetric scale, which was then multiplied by a weight obtained in a survey item in which
respondents indicated to which extent they cared about the particular opinion. This measure is
best considered a formative variable since the social influence of parents, siblings and friends
may be additive in nature.
Table 2: Attitudinal Measures and Assessments
Ex ante S.E. Ex post S.E. Difference p-value
Attitude towards entrepreneurship 4.319 (0.100) 4.389 (0.110) 0.070 p = 0.357
(scale, 5 items)
Risk preference 4.774 (0.111) 4.841 0.114 0.068 p = 0.452
(scale, 6 items)
Entrepreneurial self-efficacy 6.466 (0.094) 6.513 (0.096) 0.047 p = 0.617
(scale, 20 items)
Feasibility of start-up project 1.551 (0.060) 1.656 (0.065) 0.106 p = 0.028
(scale, 6 items)
Perceived social norms -2.413 (2.178) -4.163 (2.057) 1.75 p = 0.261
(weighted sum of 4 items)
Note: N=196. Responses from matched surveys of LMU students.
Table 2 summarizes the mean values of these measures and their differences. Only the
perceived feasibility of handling a startup project has seen a statistically significant change of
about 7 percent of its ex ante value. An even larger change is apparent in a confidence measure
summarized in Table 3.
Ex post students agree less to the statement ”I can always conclude my projects success-
fully” than ex ante, and the change is marginally significant (p=0.087). The confrontation with
a real-world problem may have led to an adjustment of assessments. A large and significant
improvement is apparent in the response to the statement ”I know everything that is needed to
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start a new enterprise.” The ex ante average response to that statement was between ”do not
agree” and ”rather not agree” (mean value 2.50) and shifts to a mean value of 3.87 (between
”rather not agree” and ”neither agree nor disagree”).
Table 3: Confidence Assessments
Ex ante Ex post Difference p-value
1. I can always conclude my 5.43 5.31 -0.12 p = 0.087
projects successfully.
2. I know everything that is needed 2.5 3.87 1.37 p < 0.001
to start a new enterprise.
3. I am very self-confident 4.88 4.98 0.1 p = 0.028
Note: N=196. Responses measured on rating scales from 1 to 7 in matched surveys of LMU students.
Moreover, the measure of general self-confidence has risen significantly, but much less than
the response to the entrepreneurship-specific question. We conclude from these answers that
the training has had a significant positive effect on students’ skills and self-confidence, and
that it may have led to a reduced, and possibly more realistic assessment of project success.
Now we turn to the assessment of the course. We discuss this here to exclude the possibility
that students disliked the course, leading them to dislike entrepreneurship.
An overall positive assessment of the course emerges from course evaluation questions
available for 274 students participating in the course evaluation. These are tabulated in Table
4. 81.4% (9.1%) percent of the students agreed (were neutral) to the statement that they
”better understand the steps that one has to take to found a firm.” The cooperation with real-
world entrepreneurs yielded a smaller effect. 57.5% (25.1%) agreed (were neutral) that they
”better understand the attitudes, values and motivation of entrepreneurs.”6 An improvement of
practical management skills for founding a firm was confirmed by 66.8% percent of students,
19.7% were neutral, 13.5% percent did not see an improvement. Asked whether the course
has had the effect that ”I will consider founding or taking over an enterprise” 41.6% responded
positively, and 38.3% negatively. 20.1% percent of students gave a neutral response. 34.7%
6 The somewhat smaller effect is probably due to the fact that student teams engaged in considerable division
of labor, and that only some students within the respective teams directly interacted with the cooperating
entrepreneurs.
19
percents stated that as an effect of the course, they would tend to prefer an employee position,
41.2% disagreed with that statement, and 24.1% were neutral.
Table 4: Students’ Assessments of Course Impact
Statement Agreement to the statement
negative neutral positive
The course has had the effect
... that I understand the attitudes, values 17.5% 25.1% 57.5%
and motivation of entrepreneurs better.
... that I understand the steps that one has 9.5% 9.1% 81.4%
to take to found a firm better.
... of improving my practical management skills 13.5% 19.7% 66.8%
for founding a firm.
... of improving my networking skills. 27.0% 26.3% 46.7%
... of improving my skills to recognize 24.8% 22.6% 52.6%
business ideas.
... that I will consider founding or taking over 38.3% 20.1% 41.6%
an enterprise.
... that I will tend to prefer an employee 41.2% 24.1% 34.7%
position.
Note: N=196 - data from the ex post survey and course evaluation.
Data were originally coded on a 1 to 7 rating scale and have been recoded to 1/3=negative, 4=neutral, 5/7=positive.
Cross-tabulating the last two responses shows that at the end of the course, about 40% percent
of students indicated that they have entrepreneurial intentions (and a dislike of an employee
position), and about 35% have the opposite preference.
5.3 Changes in Entrepreneurial Intentions
Entrepreneurial intentions were surveyed with two items in the questionnaires. First, we asked
a direct question ”Would you like to found your own enterprise at some point?” requesting a
yes or no-response. Second, we asked for an indication of agreement regarding the statement
”I intend to found my own enterprise within the next five to ten years” with responses on a
seven-point rating scale. The results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.
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Table 5: Ex ante and ex post Entrepreneurial Intentions
Would you like to found your own enterprise at some point?
Ex post response
no yes Total
Ex ante no 46 10 56 28.6%
response yes 25 115 140 71.4%
Total 71 125 196 100.0%
36.2% 63.8& 100.0%
Note: N=274 - data from the ex post survey and course evaluation.
Table 5 shows that the share of students indicating that they want to found their own
business at some point has decreased at the conclusion of the course. In the pre-course survey,
71.4% of the 196 students indicated entrepreneurial intentions. At the conclusion of the course,
this share has decreased to 63.8%. The differences are highly significant in a chi-square test
(Pearson’s chi-squared=71.6, p < 0.001).
Table 6: Ex ante and ex post Entrepreneurial Intentions
I intend to start my own enterprise within the next five to ten years.
Ex post response
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
strongly disagree 8 4 3 0 0 1 0 16 8.2%
disagree 10 13 3 1 0 0 0 27 13.8%
somewhat disagree 4 8 12 3 6 2 1 36 18.4%
Ex ante neutral 2 3 10 11 8 4 0 38 19.4%
response somewhat agree 1 1 0 7 14 5 1 29 14.8%
agree 0 2 0 3 5 12 4 26 13.3%
strongly agree 1 0 2 1 2 6 12 24 12.2%
Total 26 31 30 26 35 30 18 196 100.0%
13.3% 15.8% 15.3% 13.3% 17.9% 15.3% 9.2% 100.0%
Note: N=196. Responses from matched surveys of LMU students.
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Table 6 contains the results for the more detailed measure of entrepreneurial intentions. Con-
sistent with the results in Table 5, the average score (interpreting the scale as metric) has
decreased from 4.08 to 3.89 (p=0.069 in a two-tailed test, N=196). However, the distribution
itself is quite informative. The share of neutral responses has declined from 19.4 to 13.3%.
The neutral overall balance in the ex ante survey (40.2 vs. 40.2% with negative vs. positive
assessments) has given way to a slightly more negative result (44.4 vs. 42.3%). These changes
are small, but they appear to indicate that the course helps students to develop a more precise
idea of their future plans. The number of students with neutral assessments declines, opinions
become stronger.
Table 7: Changes in Entrepreneurial Intention by ex ante
Intention
Change in ex post response
Change No change Total
strongly disagree 8 50.0% 8 50.0% 16
disagree 14 51.9% 13 48.1% 27
somewhat disagree 24 66.7% 12 33.3% 36
Ex ante neutral 27 71.1% 11 28.9% 38
response somewhat agree 15 51.7% 14 48.3% 29
agree 14 53.8% 12 46.2% 26
strongly agree 12 50.0% 12 50.0% 24
Total 114 58.2% 82 41.8% 196
Note: N=196. Responses from matched surveys of LMU students.
This result is also apparent in Table 7 where we cross-tabulate a discrete measure of changes
in entrepreneurial intentions with the ex ante intention. This table shows that students with
strong ex ante opinions were less likely to change their intentions than students with more
indifferent intentions. Changes in intentions occur mostly for the group of the undecided, as
one would expect in a world with Bayesian updating during the course.
If students update their beliefs about themselves, some of them should also revise opinions
that they have held before. Table 8 contains interesting evidence regarding this process. In
the upper panel of the table, we display which percentage of students who had indicated a
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particular level of entrepreneurial intentions have parents or friends who are self-employed.
For example, while only 12.5% of those who disagreed strongly with the statement ”I intend
to found my own enterprise within the next five to ten years” had self-employed parents, the
share of students with self-employed parents was 58.3% for those in the highest response cat-
egory. There is a clear bivariate relationship between parental self-employment and students’
intentions. This is even more clearly visible once we condition parental self-employment on
positive experience. The relationship is less pronounced for self-employment of friends, but
again clearer once one requires self-employment to have been a positive experience.
Table 8: Ex ante and ex post Entrepreneurial Intentions
Ex ante statement: ”I intend to found my own enterprise within the next five to ten years.”
parent self- ... and positive friends self- ... and positive
Level of agreement employed experience employed experience N
strongly disagree 12.5% 6.3% 68.6% 31.3% 16
disagree 29.6% 22.2% 66.7% 55.6% 27
somewhat disagree 36.1% 30.6% 77.8% 58.3% 36
neutral 43.2% 35.1% 83.8% 75.7% 37
somewhat agree 41.4% 34.5% 82.8% 65.5% 29
agree 53.8% 53.8% 69.2% 65.4% 26
strongly agree 58.3% 54.2% 91.7% 87.5% 24
Total 40.5% 54.2% 77.9% 64.6% 195
Ex post statement: ”I intend to found my own enterprise within the next five to ten years.”
parent self- ... and positive friends self- ... and positive
Level of agreement employed experience employed experience N
strongly disagree 23.1% 15.4% 69.2% 46.2% 26
disagree 32.3% 29.0% 71.0% 51.6% 31
somewhat disagree 40.0% 36.7% 86.7% 70.0% 30
neutral 53.8% 34.6% 84.6% 73.1% 26
somewhat agree 29.4% 26.5% 76.5% 64.7% 34
agree 50.0% 46.7% 73.3% 66.7% 30
strongly agree 66.7% 66.7% 88.9% 88.9% 18
Total 40.5% 54.2% 77.9% 64.6% 195
Note: parental and friends’ self-employment is taken from the ex-ante survey in both panels.
Note: N=195. Responses from matched surveys of LMU students.
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While these results are not surprising, the second panel of Table 8 yields a helpful insight.
When we tabulate the results again using the ex post responses, we find that the share of
self-employed parents or friends has become much more higher in the lower ex post response
categories. The share of students with self-employed parents has almost doubled now in the
lower response category, and it has increased somewhat in the upper one. This shows that
students get detached from some signals that affected their ex ante entrepreneurial intentions.
At the end of this section we are left with an interesting puzzle. The course has apparently
led to somewhat diminished entrepreneurial intentions among students.7 However, it has also
led students to develop less ambiguous ideas about their future plans. Students state that they
feel more assured regarding the capabilities needed to found a new enterprise (see Table 3
and Table 4). Moreover, we find interesting evidence that students reshape their intentions
and opinions regarding entrepreneurship during the course. ”Weak” opinions become more
defined, and students become detached from previous convictions as determined by parental
background and former personal environment. At the same time, the information that students
have received has led to reduced entrepreneurial intentions. We consider these descriptive
results quite important since they cast new light on the learning process itself, rather than the
level of entrepreneurial intentions. In the next section we test the predictions of our formal
model to see whether Bayesian updating provides an explanation for what we observe.
6 Testing Bayesian Updating
We now proceed to test the hypotheses that were developed in section 3.3. We begin by
presenting the variables which enter our regressions and tests. Then we present results of a
differences of variances test and two regressions.
7 We have to sound a warning here - the sentiment of students regarding entrepreneurship may also have
been affected by the financial crises that began to impact the economy at the end of 2009 - exactly the time
when students enrolled in this class. Our control group data will allow us to compute the actual treatment
effect. In the current analysis we focus on changes in entrepreneurial intentions using data from the pre-post
comparison.
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6.1 Description of Variables
As noted in Section 3.3 above we investigate how consistent and strong signals before and
during the course affect the strength of students’ beliefs after the course (period two). Stu-
dents could have strong beliefs that they are entrepreneurs or that they are employees after
period two. Similarly they could have received strong signals that they are either employees
or entrepreneurs before and during the course.
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
B¯ 3.497 3.771 3.236 0.003 9.351
4¯ 2.000 1.000 4.335 0.000 36.000
Perceived social norms -4.404 0.000 28.063 -78.000 84.000
Scale: entrepreneurial self 6.552 6.600 1.338 1.950 10.000
efficacy
Scale: risk preference 4.818 4.857 1.537 1.143 8.571
Scale: feasibility assessment 1.582 1.500 0.831 -0.333 4.333
period one
Change in feasibility 0.106 0.167 0.657 -2.000 2.200
assessment scales
Strong signals period one 0.680 0.250 1.042 0.000 8.028
Strong signals period two 0.433 0.111 0.651 0.000 4.694
Consistent signals 0.471 0.000 – 0.000 1.000
Parents self-employed 0.424 0.000 – 0.000 1.000
Friends self-employed 0.771 1.000 – 0.000 1.000
non- German 0.213 0.000 – 0.000 1.000
Female 0.545 1.000 – 0.000 1.000
Protestant 0.254 0.000 – 0.000 1.000
We measure the strength of beliefs and signals by constructing the squared deviation of
students’ signals and beliefs from the means of these measures. In this way extreme beliefs
and signals that one is an entrepreneur or that one is an employee have the same effect.
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The dependent variables We use detailed measures of students’ intentions to found an en-
terprise within the next five to ten years as our dependent variable in the empirical test of
Hypothesis 2. In order to capture the strength of students’ beliefs that they are (are not)
entrepreneurs we transformed the measure of students’ intentions to found. The squared devi-
ation from the mean of students’ second period intentions to found (B¯) forms our measure of
the strength of students’ second period intentions.
Hypothesis 3 is based on the change in students’ intentions resulting from entrepreneurship
education. The dependent measure here is the squared change of intentions to found (4¯). This
variable is clearly skewed. Regressions in which we use its logarithm as the dependent variable
produce qualitatively identical results to those reported below.
Signals and their strength We measure the level of students’ pre course signals of their
type using the questions on students’ assessment of the feasibility of founding and running
an independent and own company. We construct a scale from six questions on feasibility to
capture the signals students receive before the course.
The level of the signals students receive from the course is measured by the difference
between the ex-post responses to the feasibility questions aggregated to a scale and the ex-
ante responses to the same questions aggregated to a scale.
The strength of both the first period and the second period signals was measured by tak-
ing the squared deviation from the means of the signal measures. These variables indicate
whether a student received particularly strong signals about their type, regardless of whether
they believe themselves to be entrepreneurs or employees.
Consistency of signals We define a sequence of signals as consistent if the first and the
second period signals were both high or the first period signals were both low.
Control variables We employ a number of control variables such as gender, nationality
and confession as well the scales for self efficacy, risk and control which were discussed
previously.
26
6.2 Test of Hypothesis 1
We have shown that Bayesian updating has the effect that students’ beliefs about their en-
trepreneurial ability will have greater variance after students receive an informative signal of
their ability. Table 10 sets out the standard deviations of students’ beliefs about their en-
trepreneurial ability for the pre- and post-course samples. We provide these for the full set of
students who responded to at least one survey and for the restricted sample of students that
took part in both surveys. We also consider the latter sample excluding all those students
whose first period intentions to become entrepreneurs were in a range indicating indecision
(neutral or somewhat agree / disagree) and whose intentions had not changed in period two.
This indicates that these students did not receive sufficiently strong signals from the course or
that they do not update beliefs as predicted by Bayes’ Rule.
Table 10: Comparing the Variances of ex ante and ex post Beliefs
Standard Deviation of Beliefs by Sample
Full Estimation Restricted - Estimation
N 541 392 318
Response ex ante 1.821 1.806 1.965
time ex post 1.873 1.898 2.068
p-value
Test statistic F-test 0.323 0.243 0.260
Levene’s robust test 0.455 0.357 0.117
Brown and Forsythe’s 0.394 0.365 0.113
median test
Table 10 shows that the variance of beliefs about entrepreneurial ability increases in all
three samples: beliefs after entrepreneurship education have greater variance than beliefs be-
fore. However, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the two variances are statistically
identical, although the results are close to significant in the restricted sample. Therefore, we
are not able to provide much support for Bayesian updating on the basis of this test alone.
Note however, that the test also provides no grounds to reject Bayesian updating. We include
the test as it is narrowly inconclusive and may prove useful in larger samples.
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Table 11: Regressions for Strength of Intentions in Period Two
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: B¯ B¯ B¯ B¯
Strong first period 0.625*** 0.764*** 0.770***
signals (0.236) (0.254) (0.249)
Consistent signals 1.959** 2.339*** 2.351***
(0.773) (0.816) (0.791)
Consistent and strong 3.343*** 3.263*** 3.166**
signals (1.254) (1.252) (1.226)
Strong second period -0.550 -0.506
signals (0.388) (0.382)
non - German 0.363 0.602 0.604
(0.661) (0.613) (0.611)
Female -0.032 -0.034 -0.021
(0.532) (0.492) (0.490)
Protestant 0.707 0.871 0.885 0.738
(0.600) (0.555) (0.554) (0.536)
Parents self-employed 0.284 -0.106 -0.094
(0.519) (0.482) (0.481)
Friends self-employed -0.355 -0.377 -0.378
(0.612) (0.564) (0.563)
Scale: feasibility -0.544 -0.897** -0.943** -0.715**
assessment period one (0.456) (0.426) (0.426) (0.286)
Scale: feasibility -0.221 -0.163 -0.126 0.044
assessment period two (0.436) (0.403) (0.403) (0.350)
Scale: entrepreneurial 0.315 0.173 0.178
self efficacy (0.247) (0.229) (0.228)
Scale: risk preference -0.299* -0.171 -0.172
(0.177) (0.164) (0.164)
Perceived social norm 0.004 0.008 0.009
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Constant 3.848** 3.926*** 4.050*** 3.736***
(1.599) (1.476) (1.474) (0.513)
Adjusted R-squared -0.015 0.143 0.148 0.162
N 189 189 189 189
Standard errors are shown in parentheses: ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) denotes a 1% (5%,10%) level of significance.
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6.3 Test of Hypothesis 2
Table 11 sets out results from regressions performed to test Hypothesis 2. Note that the de-
pendent variable in this regression is a continuous variable, so that we use OLS. There are 189
observations as we do not have responses on all questions contained in the feasibility scale
from all those students who took part in the first and second round surveys. We set out four
regressions. The first contains only control variables and shows that none of these is able to ex-
plain the strength of students’ intentions to become entrepreneurs or to avoid entrepreneurship
after the course. This is interesting because several of these variables do provide information
about the level of students’ intentions before and after the course.8
Next we include the three measures suggested by Hypothesis 2: a measure of the strength
of first period beliefs, a measure of consistent beliefs and the interaction of these two measures.
Our results show that all three measures have positive sign and are significant at the 1% and 5%
levels respectively. In the regressions reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 11 we use the same
large set of control variables as in Column 1. We find that apart from the feasibility assessment
scale non of these variables is significant. Not even the strength of the second period signal
has any effects. In the regression reported in Column 4 we drop all those controls that are
insignificant above the 20% level. We arrived at the specification reported there by iteratively
removing the least significant controls one by one. While the adjusted R-squared measure of
this last regression is clearly highest we find that the coefficients we estimate are not much
affected by the procedure. We conclude that the effects we identify are robust.
These results indicate that the strength and consistency of students’ signals affect inten-
tions to become entrepreneurs as predicted in Hypothesis 2.
6.4 Test of Hypothesis 3
To test Hypothesis 3 we seek to establish whether students who have received consistent sig-
nals and who have a stronger signal in the first period are less likely to adjust their beliefs in
the second period. Table 12 shows that we are unable to reject the Hypothesis 3.
8 We do not report regressions on the intentions ex ante and ex post here as our model makes no predictions
about these. The regressions are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 12: Regressions for Extent of Changes in Intentions
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: 4¯ 4¯ 4¯
Strong first period -0.567* -0.690** -0.662**
signals (0.330) (0.332) (0.328)
Consistent signals 2.240** 2.295** 2.368**
(1.100) (1.107) (1.094)
Consistent and strong -3.585** -3.614** -3.693**
first period signals (1.692) (1.708) (1.677)
Strong second period 0.983* 0.917* 0.923*
signals (0.529) (0.525) (0.523)
non - German -0.957
(0.831)
Female 0.706
(0.665)
Protestant 0.275
(0.751)
Parents self-employed -1.315** -1.152*
(0.646) (0.627)
Friends self-employed 0.385
(0.763)
Scale: entrepreneurial 0.417 0.347
self efficacy (0.270) (0.264)
Scale: risk preference -0.445** -0.455**
(0.223) (0.218)
Perceived social norm 0.025** 0.022*
(0.012) (0.012)
Constant 1.782*** 1.389 2.363
(0.409) (1.976) (1.772)
Adjusted R-squared 0.056 0.078 0.086
N 189 189 189
Standard errors are shown in parentheses: ∗∗∗ (∗∗, ∗) denotes a 1% (5%, 10%) level of significance.
Table 12 provides three OLS regressions. In column (1) we just regress the main variables
of interest on the dependent variable. We find that the strength of first and second period
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signals significantly affects changes in intentions as do consistent signals and the interaction
of consistent and strong first period signals. The interaction term has the sign predicted in
Proposition 3. It is also not surprising that strong second period signals change intentions
more while strong first period beliefs make it less likely that intentions change.
In column (2) we introduce a large set of control variables. This does not affect the sig-
nificance of the four main variables of interest, nor are the coefficients significantly altered.
Column (3) provides a regression in which we test down, iteratively removing the least sig-
nificant regressors. Once more this has no significant effect on the signs or coefficients of
regressors we are most interested in.
These results indicate that the strength and consistency of students’ signals affect changes
in students’ intentions to become entrepreneurs as predicted in Hypothesis 3.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides an analysis of learning processes in entrepreneurship education. While
entrepreneurship education has been introduced and promoted in many countries and at many
institutions of tertiary education, little is known at this point about the effect of these courses.
In particular, it is largely unknown how the courses impact students’ willingness to engage in
entrepreneurial activity and what kind of learning processes are responsible for these effects.
In the context of funding of entrepreneurial ventures it has been argued that subsidizing
finance for new entrepreneurs could be socially wasteful (de Meza and Southey, 1996; de
Meza, 2002). By analogy, one might expect that entrepreneurship education could have nega-
tive effects if it succeeded in convincing those not suited to entrepreneurship that they should
become entrepreneurs. Alternatively, and more positively, it could be that such education
actually informs students and allows them to discover where their abilities lie.
In this paper we analyze the effects of entrepreneurship education on a group of students
who are not selected for their interest in entrepreneurship. We postulate that student behav-
ior is largely be driven by Bayesian updating - students enter entrepreneurship courses with
prior beliefs about their own ”type”, but update their beliefs in the course of entrepreneurship
training. Based on a simple theoretical model we derived three hypotheses that link ex post in-
tentions as well as changes in intentions to the strength and consistency of signals received by
students prior to and during the entrepreneurship course. Data were collected in a compulsory
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entrepreneurship class at a large German university.
In our descriptive analysis, we find evidence that students update their beliefs, and that
initially undecided students are particularly likely to change their entrepreneurial intentions.
We are not able to show (Hypothesis 1) that the variance of beliefs increased significantly
during the course, but the result may have been due to a lack of power of the test. Our two
other hypothesis tests yield the predicted result, however. We show that strong ex ante beliefs
and consistency of signals lead to stronger ex post intentions, and that changes in intentions
due to the course tend to be smaller if ex ante signals are strong and if the signals received by
students are consistent.
A number of caveats apply. The current study does not employ data from a control group.9
Hence, we cannot exclude the possibility that students updated their beliefs based on infor-
mation that was extraneous to the course. We consider this unlikely, since the course contents
were very specific and not duplicated in other courses. Nor do we know if particular content
characteristics of this course have led to the described outcomes.
In our overall assessment, the results can be read as confirmation for educational policies
that view entrepreneurship training as a way of informing students about career options, and
of creating learning opportunities for calibrating and refining their assessments of which ca-
reer is most suitable. We have no means to assess how costly the mistakes of choosing the
”wrong” career would be to the students and to society at large. Hence, we cannot quantify
the true economic and societal impact of entrepreneurship training. But it seems worthwhile
to consider that a simple increase in entrepreneurial activity may neither be a good objective,
nor the most likely outcome for including entrepreneurship in the curriculum.
In future work we intend to further test the theoretical framework describing the effects
of entrepreneurship education that has been developed in this paper. We will reapply the
framework to other entrepreneurship courses and seek to establish whether the framework
also describes effects of other types of education, which are intended to help students discover
their proclivity for a specific type of work.
9 In addition to the data collection for the course studied, we also obtained data on a small sample of students
at another Munich university. However, with 44 observations the sample is to small for setting up a fully
developed pre-post control group design. Entrepreneurial intentions declined in the control group as well
and more strongly than in our treatment group.
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Appendix
Here we present the calculations which underpin Propositions 1- 3.
7.1 Expectation and variance of first and second period beliefs
This section sets out the proof of Proposition 1. First, we derive the expectations of first and
second period beliefs. Then we derive the variances of first and second stage beliefs. Finally,
we show when the variance of second stage beliefs exceeds that of first stage beliefs.
The expectation of first period beliefs
µ1 = φ
(
ψnBnn + (1− ψn)Bnm
)
+ (1− φ)
(
ψm(1−Bmn ) + (1− ψm)(1−Bmm)
)
. (7)
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Given that Bnn = 1−Bmn and Bmm = 1−Bnm we can show that:
µ1 =
(
Bnn −Bnm
)(
φψn + ψm(1− φ)
)
+Bnm . (8)
We define λ ≡
(
φψn + ψm(1− φ)
)
to simplify calculations further below. Note that it must
be true that 1 ≥ λ ≥ 0. Now we reexpress the expectation of first stage beliefs as:
µ1 = λB
n
n + (1− λ)Bnm . (9)
The variance of first period beliefs Given the definition of the expectation of first stage
beliefs the variance of first stage beliefs may be written as:
V1 = λ (B
n
n − µ1)2 + (1− λ) (Bnm − µ1)2 . (10)
Substituting out the expectation and simplifying we obtain:
V1 = λ(1− λ) (Bnn −Bnm)2 . (11)
The expectation of second period beliefs
µ2 = B
n
n|n
(
φ(ψn)2+(1−φ)(ψm)2
)
+
[
Bnn|m +B
n
m|n
] (
φ(1−ψn)ψn+(1−φ)ψm(1−ψm)
)
+Bnm|m
(
φ(1− ψn)2 + (1− φ)(1− ψm)2
)
, (12)
where we have already taken into account that Bni|k = 1−Bmi|k for k∧ i ∈ {m,n}. Now define
Λ = φ(ψn)2 + (1− φ)(ψm)2. We can then simplify the above expression to:
µ2 =
(
Bnn|n −Bnm|m
)
Λ +
(
Bnn|m +B
n
m|n
)[
λ− Λ
]
+Bnm|m
[
1− 2λ
]
. (13)
This leads us to:
µ2 =
(
Bnn|n + B
n
m|m −
(
Bnm|n +B
n
n|m
))[
Λ − λ
]
+
(
Bnn|nλ + B
n
m|m(1 − λ)
)
. (14)
To simplify further calculations we define R ≡
(
Bnn|n + B
n
m|m −
(
Bnm|n +B
n
n|m
))
and S ≡(
Bnn|n − Bnm|m
)
. Then we can express the expectation of second stage beliefs as: µ2 =
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R
[
Λ− λ
]
+ Sλ+Bnm|m.
The variance of second period beliefs
V2 =
((
Bnn|m − µ2
)2
+
(
Bnm|n − µ2
)2 − ((Bnn|n − µ2)2 + (Bnm|m − µ2)2 )) [λ− Λ]
+
(
Bnn|n − µ2
)2
λ+
(
Bnm|m − µ2
)2
[1− λ] (15)
where as above we take into account that Bni|k = 1−Bmi|k for k ∧ i ∈ {m,n}. If we substitute
out the expected value of second period beliefs using the definitions given above we have:
V2 =
[(
R
[
λ− Λ
]
− Sλ+Bnn|m −Bnm|m
)2
+
(
R
[
λ− Λ
]
− Sλ+Bnm|n −Bnm|m
)2]
[λ− Λ]
−
[(
R
[
λ− Λ
]
+ S (1− λ)
)2
+
(
R
[
λ− Λ
]
− Sλ
)2]
[λ− Λ]
+R2
[
λ− Λ
]2
+ S2 (1− λ)λ (16)
Defining Z ≡ R
[
λ− Λ
]
− Sλ this may be further simplified to:
V2 =
[(
Z + (Bnn|m −Bnm|m)
)2
+
(
Z + (Bnm|n −Bnm|m)
)2 − (Z + S)2 − Z2] [λ− Λ]
+R2
[
λ− Λ
]2
+ S2 (1− λ)λ (17)
=
[(
Bnn|m −Bnm|m
)2
+
(
Bnm|n −Bnm|m
)2 − S2 − 2ZR] [λ− Λ] +R2[λ− Λ]2 + S2 (1− λ)λ
=
[(
Bnn|m −Bnm|m
)2
+
(
Bnm|n −Bnm|m
)2
+R2Λ +Rλ(2S −R)
]
[λ− Λ] + S2 (Λ− λ2)
The difference of first and second period variance of beliefs Here we show that the vari-
ance of second stage beliefs (V2) is greater than the variance of first stage beliefs (V1).
Note that:
V2−V1 =
[ Z︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Bnn|m −Bnm|m
)2
+
(
Bnm|n −Bnm|m
)2
−
(
Bnn −Bnm
)2
+R2Λ+Rλ
(
2S−R
)]
[λ− Λ]
+
[
S2 −
(
Bnn −Bnm
)2](
Λ− λ2
)
. (18)
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Given that S = Bnn|n−Bnm|m it is easily shown that S = (Bnn|n−Bnn) + (Bnn −Bnm) + (Bnm−
Bnm|m). Each of the differences in this sum is non-negative if Assumption (I) holds. Therefore,
it must be the case that S > (Bnn − Bnm). Note also that (λ − Λ) and (Λ − λ2) are always
non-negative if Assumption (I) holds.
It remains to show that Z =
(
Bnn|m − Bnm|m
)2
+
(
Bnm|n − Bnm|m
)2
−
(
Bnn − Bnm
)2
> 0.
A change of variables will simplify the argument here. Define a ≡ (Bnn|m − Bnm), b ≡
(Bnm −Bnm|m) and c ≡ (Bnm|n −Bnm). Then we can reexpress the problem as:
Z =(a+ b)2 + (c+ (Bnn −Bnm) + b)2 − (Bnn −Bnm)2 > 0
=a2 + 2b2 + 2ab+ c2 + 2bc+ 2b(Bnn −Bnm) + 2c(Bnn −Bnm) > 0
=a2 + c2 + 2ab+ 2(Bnn −Bnm|m)(b+ c) . (19)
This expression is positive as long as b + c > 0. We show below that this corresponds to
the requirement that −4nm|m > −4nm|n which is the case if 1/2 ≥ σn1 and if Assumption (I)
holds.
7.2 Second period beliefs
Here we derive results on levels and changes in second period beliefs as first period beliefs
change. We focus on beliefs of entrepreneurs as those of employees can be derived by rela-
beling. We comment on this below.
Consistent and inconsistent signals Here we show that beliefs of students that they are
entrepreneurs if they receive consistent signals that they are entrepreneurs are higher than
beliefs of all other students. We also show that beliefs of students that they are entrepreneurs
if they receive consistent signals that they are not entrepreneurs are lower than beliefs of all
other students. This is the first part of Proposition 2.
We show that: Bnn|n > B
n
m|n, B
n
n|n > B
n
n|m. We also show that: B
n
m|m < B
n
m|n, B
n
m|m <
Bnn|m. The corresponding relationships for employees hold by symmetry: B
m
n|n < B
m
m|n, B
m
n|n <
Bnn|m and B
m
m|m > B
m
m|n, B
m
m|m > B
n
n|m.
It is easily shown that:
Bnn|n −Bnn|m =
σn2B
n
n
σn2B
n
n + σ
m
2 B
m
n
− σ
n
2B
n
m
σn2B
n
m + σ
m
2 B
m
m
=
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σn2σ
m
2 φ(1− φ)
(
σn1 − σm1
)
[σn2σ
n
1φ+ σ
m
2 σ
m
1 (1− φ)] [σn2 (1− σn1 )φ+ σm2 (1− σm1 )(1− φ)]
> 0 (20)
Bnn|n −Bnm|n =
σn2B
n
n
σn2B
n
n + σ
m
2 B
m
n
− (1− σ
n
2 )B
n
n
(1− σn2 )Bnn + (1− σm2 )Bmn
=
(σn2 − σm2 )BnnBmn
[σn2B
n
n + σ
m
2 B
m
n ] [(1− σn2 )Bnn + (1− σm2 )Bmn ]
> 0 (21)
Bnm|m −Bnn|m =
(1− σn2 )Bnm
(1− σn2 )Bnm + (1− σm2 )Bmm
− σ
n
2B
n
m
σn2B
n
m + σ
m
2 B
m
m
=
(σm2 − σn2 )BnmBmm
[σn2B
n
m + σ
m
2 B
m
m ] [(1− σn2 )Bnm + (1− σm2 )Bmm ]
< 0 (22)
Bnm|m −Bnn|m =
(1− σn2 )Bnm
(1− σn2 )Bnm + (1− σm2 )Bmm
− σ
n
2B
n
m
σn2B
n
m + σ
m
2 B
m
m
=
(1− σn1 )(1− σm1 )(1− φ)φ
[
σm2 − σn2
]
[(1− σn2 )(1− σn1 )φ+ (1− σm2 )(1− σm1 )(1− φ)] [σn2 (1− σn1 )φ+ σm2 (1− σm1 )(1− φ)]
< 0
(23)
These expressions imply that students receiving consistent signals hold stronger second period
beliefs than students receiving inconsistent signals.
Comparative statics of consistent signals We investigate how the strength of first period
signals affects the strength of second period beliefs where strength is defined as in Section 3.3.
∂Bnn|n
∂σn1
=
∂
∂σn1
σn2σ
n
1φ
σn2σ
n
1φ+ σ
m
2 σ
m
1 (1− φ)
=
σn2σ
m
2 σ
m
1 φ (1− φ)
(σn2σ
n
1φ+ σ
m
2 σ
m
1 (1− φ))2
> 0 (24)
∂Bnn|n
∂σm1
=
∂
∂σm1
σn2σ
n
1φ
σn2σ
n
1φ+ σ
m
2 σ
m
1 (1− φ)
= − σ
n
2σ
n
1σ
m
2 φ (1− φ)
(σn2σ
n
1φ+ σ
m
2 σ
m
1 (1− φ))2
< 0 (25)
These derivatives demonstrate that second period beliefs of entrepreneurs who receive consis-
tent signals that they are entrepreneurs increase as first period signals for entrepreneurs and
for employees become stronger. Note that signals are stronger if (σn1 → 1) or (σm1 → 0).
∂Bnm|m
∂σn1
=
∂
∂σn1
(1− σn2 )(1− σn1 )φ
(1− σn2 )(1− σn1 )φ+ (1− σm2 )(1− σm1 ) (1− φ)
= − (1− σ
n
2 )(1− σm2 )(1− σm1 )φ (1− φ)
((1− σn2 )(1− σn1 )φ+ (1− σm2 )(1− σm1 ) (1− φ))2
< 0
(26)
∂Bnm|m
∂σm1
=
∂
∂σm1
(1− σn2 )(1− σn1 )φ
(1− σn2 )(1− σn1 )φ+ (1− σm2 )(1− σm1 ) (1− φ)
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=
(1− σn2 )(1− σn1 )(1− σm2 )φ (1− φ)
((1− σn2 )(1− σn1 )φ+ (1− σm2 )(1− σm1 ) (1− φ))2
> 0
(27)
These derivatives demonstrate that second period beliefs of entrepreneurs who receive consis-
tent signals that they are employees decrease as first period signals for entrepreneurs and for
employees become more precise.
Comparative statics of inconsistent signals
∂Bnm|n
∂σn1
=
∂
∂σn1
(1− σn2 )σn1φ
(1− σn2 )σn1φ+ (1− σm2 )σm1 (1− φ)
=
(1− σn2 )(1− σm2 )σm1 φ (1− φ)
((1− σn2 )σn1φ+ (1− σm2 )σm1 (1− φ))2
> 0
(28)
∂Bnm|n
∂σm1
=
∂
∂σm1
(1− σn2 )σn1φ
(1− σn2 )σn1φ+ (1− σm2 )σm1 (1− φ)
= − (1− σ
n
2 )σ
n
1 (1− σm2 )φ (1− φ)
((1− σn2 )σn1φ+ (1− σm2 )σm1 (1− φ))2
< 0
(29)
These derivatives demonstrate that second period beliefs of entrepreneurs who receive first a
correct and then an incorrect signal will tend to be closer to entrepreneurship
(
Bnm|n → 1
)
as
first period signals for entrepreneurs and employees become more precise.
∂Bnn|m
∂σn1
=
∂
∂σn1
σn2 (1− σn1 )φ
σn2 (1− σn1 )φ+ σm2 (1− σm1 ) (1− φ)
= − σ
n
2σ
m
2 (1− σm1 )φ (1− φ)
(σn2 (1− σn1 )φ+ σm2 (1− σm1 ) (1− φ))2
< 0 (30)
∂Bnn|m
∂σm1
=
∂
∂σm1
(1− σn2 )(1− σn1 )φ
(1− σn2 )(1− σn1 )φ+ σm2 (1− σm1 ) (1− φ)
=
σn2 (1− σn1 )σm2 φ (1− φ)
(σn2 (1− σn1 )φ+ σm2 (1− σm1 ) (1− φ))2
> 0 (31)
These derivatives demonstrate that second period beliefs of entrepreneurs who receive first an
incorrect and then a correct signal will tend to be further from entrepreneurship
(
Bnn|m → 0
)
as first period signals for entrepreneurs and employees become more precise.
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7.3 Changes in Beliefs
This section sets out the proofs of Proposition 3. We define changes in beliefs as follows:
4nn,n = Bnn|n −Bnn 4nm,m = Bnm|m −Bnm 4mn,n = Bmn|n −Bmn 4mm,m = Bnm|m −Bmm
(32)
4nn,m = Bnn|m −Bnm 4nm,n = Bnm|n −Bnn 4mn,m = Bmn|m −Bmm 4mm,n = Bmm|n −Bmn
(33)
Here the first set of changes in beliefs describes students receiving consistent signals and the
second describes students receiving inconsistent signals.
To simplify the following analysis we introduce a change of variables:
ζ ≡ (1− σn1 )φ υ = (1− σm1 )(1− φ) ν = σn1φ ω = σm1 (1− φ) (34)
Then we can simplify the expressions for changes in beliefs to:
4nn,n =
νω(σn2 − σm2 )
[ν + ω][σn2 ν + σ
m
2 ω]
4nm,m =
ζυ(σm2 − σn2 )
[ζ + υ][ζ(1− σn2 ) + υ(1− σm2 )]
4mn,n =
νω(σm2 − σn2 )
[ν + ω][σn2 ν + σ
m
2 ω]
4mm,m =
ζυ(σn2 − σm2 )
[ζ + υ][ζ(1− σn2 ) + υ(1− σm2 )]
4nn,m =
ζυ(σn2 − σm2 )
[ζ + υ][σn2 ζ + σ
m
2 υ]
4nm,n =
νω(σm2 − σn2 )
[ν + ω][ν(1− σn2 ) + ω(1− σm2 )]
4mn,m =
ζυ(σm2 − σn2 )
[ζ + υ][σn2 ζ + σ
m
2 υ]
4mm,n =
νω(σm2 − σn2 )
[ν + ω][ν(1− σn2 ) + ω(1− σm2 )]
(35)
Consistent Signals Begin first with changes in the beliefs of those receiving consistent sig-
nals. There are two groups here: those receiving correct and those receiving incorrect signals.
Correct signals:
∂4nn,n
∂σn1
=
ω(σn2 − σm2 )
[
σm2 ω
2 − σn2 ν2
]
[ν + ω]2[σn2 ν + σ
m
2 ω]
2
+︷︸︸︷
∂ν
∂σn1
(36)
∂4mm,m
∂σn1
=
υ(σn2 − σm2 )
[
(1− σm2 )υ2 − (1− σn2 )ζ2
]
[ζ + υ]2[ζ(1− σn2 ) + υ(1− σm2 )]2
−︷︸︸︷
∂ζ
∂σn1
(37)
43
By definition we know that σn2 ≥ σm2 . If the signals students receive in periods one and
two are not completely uninformative and there are approximately as many entrepreneurs as
employees in the population (φ/(1 − φ) ≈ 1), then the change in beliefs of those receiving
correct signals in both periods is decreasing in the precision of the first period signal . To see
this note that in this case the overall sign of equations (36) and (37) is negative as the following
analysis of the terms in square brackets in the numerators shows:
σm2 ω
2 − σn2 ν2 = σm2 ω2
(
1− σ
n
2σ
n
1
2φ2
σm2 σ
m
1
2(1− φ)2)
)
(38)
(1− σm2 )υ2 − (1− σn2 )ζ2 = (1− σm2 )υ2
(
1− (1− σ
n
2 )
(1− σm2 )
(1− σn1 )2φ2
(1− σm1 )2(1− φ)2
)
(39)
The terms in square brackets in the numerators of equations (36) and (37) have the opposite
sign to the signed terms at the end of each expression leading to an overall negative sign if
signals are sufficiently informative. This means that σn1 → 1 and σm1 → 0. In this case
expression (38) is negative and so is the derivative at (36). Equally, expression (39) is positive
and the derivative at (37) is negative.
Note that, if there are very few entrepreneurs in the population (φ/(1−φ)→ 0) employees’
changing beliefs will dominate those of the few remaining entrepreneurs. Employees’ beliefs
are still decreasing in the precision of the first period signal however.
If the proportion of entrepreneurs in the population is very high (φ/(1 − φ) → ∞), then
the entrepreneurs’ changing beliefs will dominate those of the few remaining employees. En-
trepreneurs’ beliefs in this case are also decreasing in the precision of the first period signal.
Note that the analysis for an increase in the precision of the employees’ first period signal
(σm1 → 0) leads to the same conclusion. This is intuitive as nothing in the model prevents us
from relabeling employees and entrepreneurs.
We have now shown that entrepreneurs and employees receiving correct and consistent
signals will display lower changes in beliefs from period one to period two if their first period
signals are more precise and these signals are sufficiently informative.
In contrast, if students receive uninformative signals then the effect of stronger first period
information differs by the type of student and by the type of signal. We do not pursue this case
here.
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Misleading signals:
∂4nm,m
∂σn1
=
υ(σm2 − σn2 )
[
υ2(1− σm2 )− ζ2(1− σn2 )
]
[ζ + υ]2[ζ(1− σn2 ) + υ(1− σm2 )]2
−︷︸︸︷
∂ζ
∂σn1
(40)
∂4mn,n
∂σn1
=
νω(σm2 − σn2 )
[
σm2 ω
2 − σn2 ν2
]
[ν + ω]2[σn2 ν + σ
m
2 ω]
2
+︷︸︸︷
∂ν
∂σn1
(41)
We can apply the same arguments as above to these two expressions. The common term
(σm2 − σn2 ), which is negative, now changes the signs of both expressions above.
We have now shown that entrepreneurs and employees receiving misleading and consistent
signals will display greater changes in beliefs from period one to period two if their first period
signals are more precise and these signals are sufficiently informative.
Conflicting Signals Now focus on those receiving contradictory signals. Here there are
two groups to distinguish depending on the sequence in which the correct and the misleading
signal arrive.
Sequence: misleading, correct We start with those who get a misleading signal and
then a correct signal.
∂4nn,m
∂σn1
=
υ(σn2 − σm2 )
[
σm2 υ
2 − σn2 ζ2
]
[ζ + υ]2[σn2 ζ + σ
m
2 υ]
2
−︷︸︸︷
∂ζ
∂σn1
(42)
∂4mm,n
∂σn1
=
ω(σn2 − σm2 )
[
(1− σm2 )ω2 − (1− σn2 )ν2
]
[ν + ω]2[ν(1− σn2 ) + ω(1− σm2 )]2
+︷︸︸︷
∂ν
∂σn1
Again we can apply the same reasoning as above. This shows that those who receive a
misleading signal first, will change their beliefs less as the precision of the first period signals
increases if signals are sufficiently informative.
Sequence: correct, misleading
∂4nm,n
∂σn1
=
νω(σm2 − σn2 )
[
(1− σm2 )ω2 − (1− σn2 )ν2
]
[ν + ω]2[ν(1− σn2 ) + ω(1− σm2 )]2
+︷︸︸︷
∂ν
∂σn1
(43)
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∂4mn,m
∂σn1
=
ζυ(σm2 − σn2 )
[
σm2 υ
2 − σn2 ζ2
]
[ζ + υ]2[σn2 ζ + σ
m
2 υ]
2
−︷︸︸︷
∂ζ
∂σn1
(44)
Again we can apply the same reasoning as above. This shows that those who receive a
correct signal first, will change their beliefs more as the precision of the first period signals
increases.
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